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COMMENTARY:
FOCUS OF ANTITRUST MARKETS
WARREN G. LAVEY*
There are several problems in Dr. Werden's analysis of my support for
the affected-buyers approach to antitrust market delineation, and of my
concerns about the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines. Werden
does not understand the purpose of my article, I and thus criticizes points
beyond its scope. While my article and others taking similar positions
are intended to make an important contribution to market delineation,
the thrust is not to present a fully specified alternative to the Guidelines.
In fact, my concerns could be satisfied by two easy amendments to the
Guidelines. Moreover, Werden misapplies the affected-buyers model to
mergers, indirect competitors, multi-output firms, and repair services.
I. PURPOSE OF AFFECTED-BUYERS MODEL
The purpose of my article was to address a dispute over how to estab-
lish a baseline from which competitive checks should be determined when
defining antitrust markets. One position in this dispute is that the com-
petitive-check analysis (delineation of close substitutes) should focus on a
demand by a group of consumers who may be harmed by the action sub-
ject to antitrust scrutiny (the buyers-alternatives model). The opposite
position is that the analysis should focus on the product(s) and loca-
tion(s) of a seller engaged in the action subject to antitrust scrutiny (the
firm-competitors model). Courts have applied each of these approaches
to antitrust market delineation. The position I support involves a twist
on the buyers-alternatives model-first focus on a demand by a group of
consumers who may be harmed by the action subject to antitrust scru-
tiny, but then expand the baseline to include the demand by other
(linked) consumers who would also be affected by an action harming the
group (the affected-buyers model). In contrast, the Guidelines employ
the firm-competitors model with a twist. The Guidelines focus first on
each of the narrowly defined products and locations of each of the merg-
* Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. B.A., Harvard College; M.S., Harvard
Univ.; Dip. Econ., Cambridge Univ.; J.D., Harvard Law School. I am grateful for the word-process-
ing assistance of Mary Ann Lack.
1. Lavey, A Close Analysis of Buyers and Antitrust Markets, 61 WAsH. U.L.Q. 745 (1983).
Washington University Open Scholarship
672 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 62:671
ing firms. The Guidelines go on to consider, however, differences among
groups of buyers conducive to price discrimination that may warrant de-
fining additional, narrower markets.
According to the Supreme Court2 and many leading scholars,3 Con-
gress designed the antitrust laws to promote consumers' welfare, i.e., pro-
tect consumers from the higher prices and lower quality flowing from
anticompetitive actions. Given the focus of the antitrust laws on protect-
ing consumers, using groups of possibly harmed consumers as a baseline
helps courts define markets more accurately. A baseline of sellers may
lead courts to miss particular consumer-seller relationships important to
certain consumers and foster mistaken conclusions about the legality of
some actions. Scholars supporting the use of consumers as a baseline for
defining antitrust markets include Landes and Posner,4 Dunfee, Stem,
and Sturdivant,5 and Harris and Jorde.6
2. The Supreme Court observed that "Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer
welfare prescription.'" Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)). In 1984, the Court analyzed a claim under Section One of the
Sherman Act "from the standpoint of the consumer-whose interests the statute was especially in-
tended to serve. ... Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1559-60
(1984). In another case under Section One of the Sherman Act, the Court quoted from Reiter and
spoke broadly of the consumer-protection goal of antitrust law, presumably encompassing the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts: "A restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer
preference in setting price and output is not consistent with this fundamental goal [consumer wel-
fare] of antitrust law." NCAA v. University of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2964 (1984); see also Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740 (1984) ("the sort of competition
that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster").
3. Leading scholars have concluded that the objective of the antitrust laws is buyer protection
(or, somewhat more broadly phrased, economic efficiency). See, e.g., 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 7-31 (1978); R. BORK, supra note 2, at 66, 81, 89; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1976); R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES,
ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 152-54 (2d ed. 1981); Harris & Jorde, Antitrust Market
Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 43-45 (1984) (recognizing also concern
about seller protection in market-foreclosure cases). In contrast, Werden recently wrote that
"[n]either the Clayton Act nor judicial interpretations of the Act require this focus [on consumers],
however, and the Guidelines do not adopt it." Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Depart-
ment's Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 521 n.27.
4. In Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 967 (1981),
the authors state that market definition should involve two steps: "[I]dentification of a group of
consumers large enough to be entitled to the protection of the antitrust laws, and identification of the
sellers who can readily supply this group of consumers."
5. In Dunfee, Stem & Sturdivant, Bounding Markets in Merger Cases: Identifying Relevant
Competitors, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 733, 737 (1983), the authors describe three steps to designate an
initial group of competitors that courts could include in the relevant market: (1) the plaintiff identi-
fies a group of distinct consumers upon which the analysis of competitive effect will focus; (2) the
court determines the needs of that group being satisfied by the products or services of the merged
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss4/4
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Defining a seller's product or products--even with the Guidelines' ad-
monition against broad definitions-often is difficult and requires analy-
sis of buyers. Employing a seller baseline may require identification and
application of a buyers baseline in order to define products, thereby call-
ing into question the benefits and clarity of a seller-based approach to
market definition. My article discussed several examples of misleading
product markets caused by insufficient analysis of buyers when defining a
seller's product(s). Without buyers analysis, the view of a seller's prod-
uct may be too broad. While it is possible to view a consumer finance
company's product as consumer loans, the fact that these firms supply
many loans to high-risk customers, who cannot turn to other financial
institutions, favors a product definition of high-risk consumer loans or
consumer loans by consumer finance companies.7 In other cases, lack of
buyers analysis means that the view of a seller's product is too narrow.
While it is possible to define a firm's product as air conditioners for
Volkswagon automobiles, analysis of buyers' choices across auto brands
favors a product definition of auto air conditioners.8
The law is clear that courts should use a buyers baseline to define
products in tying cases. An arrangement can be an unlawful tie only if it
involves two separate product markets.9 The United States Supreme
Court's standard for "whether one or two products are involved turns
not on the functional relation between them, but rather on the character
of the demand for the two items.""0 Some physical or operational char-
acteristic of the seller's output cannot define products, and the relevant
inquiry is not how the seller defines what it is supplying. Rather, the
proper inquiry should employ the perspective of a group of buyers. In
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,II the product definition
firm; and (3) the court identifies the companies actually serving, or companies with the potential to
serve the needs of that group.
6. In Harris & Jorde, supra note 3, at 43-45, the authors recommend that the plaintiff should
identify a group of buyers (or, in a market foreclosure case, sellers) alleged to be the victim of the
anticompetitive harm and protected by the antitrust laws. The plaintiff must establish a prima facie
market defined by the products used interchangeably by the group and the geographic area to which
the group turns to supply its demands.
7. Lavey, supra note I, at 761.
8. Id. at 753-55, 758-59.
9. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969).
10. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1562 (1984). See also id.
at 1572 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("For products to be treated as distinct, the tied product must, at
a minimum, be one that some consumers might wish to purchase separately without also purchasing
the tying product.").
11. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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turned on using advertisers who might be harmed by an arrangement
linking advertising in morning and evening newspapers as the relevant
buyers baseline. Advertisers viewed the city's newspaper readers, morn-
ing or evening, as fungible customer potential. The Court held that the
arrangement was not an unlawful tie because it did not link two distinct
products in the eyes of buyers (advertisers). 2 In Fortner Enterprises v.
United States Steel Corp., 13 the Court concluded that sale of a house and
credit to purchase the house involved two independent transactions, sep-
arately priced and purchased from the buyer's perspective.1 4 Most re-
cently, the Court in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde"5
concluded that two separate products were tied because "consumers dif-
ferentiate between anesthesiological services and the other hospital
services .. ."16
A merger case illustrates possible product-definition problems in em-
ploying a seller baseline rather than buyers analysis. In United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 7 the Justice Department challenged the acqui-
sition of one coal producer by another coal producer under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The Justice Department claimed that coal was the rele-
vant line of commerce and that a firm's total coal production should be
used in determining market concentration. The Supreme Court found
that many coal buyers had long-term supply contracts and therefore the
acquisition would not affect them. Given that the potentially harmed
buyers were only those looking for new supply contracts, the Court
found that the relevant product of the firms was coal supplies not com-
mitted under long-term contracts rather than all actual coal production.
It is unlikely that a firm-competitors analysis focusing solely on the prod-
uct(s) of coal mines and not analyzing buyers' demands would come to
this correct product definition.'
12. Id. at 613-14.
13. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
14. Id. at 507.
15. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
16. Id. at 1564.
17. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974); see also Posner &
Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 481-82.
18. Contrary to Werden's contention, I believe that the Justice Department does follow explicit
direction from the Supreme Court to consider uncommitted coal supplies. Werden, A Closer Analy-
sis of Antitrust Markets, 62 WASH U.L.Q. 647, 664 n.50 (1985). The point of this discussion is to
illustrate the mistaken product definitions that could flow from insufficient buyers analysis. See also
United States v. Waste Management, 588 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, [1984-2] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 1 66,190 (2d Cir. 1984). Both the district court and the appellate court rejected the Justice
[Vol. 62:671
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Defining a product market by focusing on the demand by a group of
consumers is not always crystal clear. Yet, antitrust analysis favors fo-
cusing the delineation of a product and its competitive checks on con-
sumer buyers' demands. The buyers-baseline approach to market
definition involves a consistent focus on buyers when establishing an ini-
tial product definition. In contrast, a sellers baseline requires defining a
sellers' product through a confusing mix of supply and demand consider-
ations. The likely outcome of this paradigm is that courts will delineate
misleading product markets more often.
A second problem with a sellers baseline is that delineating markets to
reflect possible price discrimination requires analysis of differences
among buyers in their demands and alternatives. My article used several
examples of buyers with different product or geographic demand charac-
teristics, or different supply alternatives, such as small versus large busi-
nesses regarding geographic access to banking services.19 I also
explained the analysis of linkages among buyers necessary to define the
contours of possible price discrimination, delineate a meaningful buyers
baseline, and determine relevant markets. For example, diabetics' de-
mand for diet soda may be linked to the demand of nondiabetics for
either diet or nondiet soda, limiting possible price discrimination against
only diabetics and leading to a relevant market that includes diet and
nondiet sodas.2"
The importance of price discrimination to models for market delinea-
tion depends on the frequency with which the conditions necessary for
price discrimination are expected to arise. Maisel observed that price
discrimination is a widespread but often unidentified economic phenome-
non,2 1 and the Supreme Court has pointed to the need to search for the
possible existence of noncompetitive segments within a proposed mar-
ket.22 My view is that conditions conducive to price discrimination are
sufficiently widespread that an approach to market definition should fo-
Department's argument that the courts should define the products of two waste collectors in terms
of the equipment type used by the sellers, and that front-load and roll-off waste collection services
each constituted a separate product market. The courts identified various relevant classes of custom-
ers, analyzed their demands and alternatives, and defined a relevant product market in terms of a
customer grouping-all trash collection except at single-family residences, multi-family residences,
and small apartment complexes.
19. Lavey, supra note 1, at 763-64.
20. Id. at 755-56.
21. Maisel, Submarkets in Merger and Monopolization Cases, 72 GEo. L.J. 39, 55-57 (1983).
22. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 457 (1964).
Number 4]
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cus on consumers and linkages among consumers. Harris and Jorde take
a similar position. 23 On the other hand, the Justice Department's Guide-
lines initially assume that price discrimination is impossible and delineate
markets accordingly using a seller baseline. Next the Guidelines con-
sider whether price discrimination is possible and, if so, finally delineate
additional, narrower markets oriented to the consumer groups (buyers
baselines) that could be the targets of discrimination. 24 Even examina-
tion of whether price discrimination is possible requires buyers analysis.
The Guidelines' bi-directional approach involving sellers as well as buy-
ers baselines is likely to confuse courts, and result in market delineations
that fail to consider price discrimination.
In summary, the purpose of my article was to analyze the advantages
of a buyers baseline in defining products and determining competitive
checks, and to explain why the buyers baseline should reflect the linkages
among buyers. This affected-buyers model could replace two aspects of
the Guidelines. First, the Justice Department could replace the starting
point of a seller's product and location with a demand by a group of
buyers that a merger or acquisition could harm (protected buyers). Sec-
ond, the Justice Department could replace the Guidelines' departure
from the seller baseline to analyze possible price discrimination. Market
definition should employ a consistent focus on buyers, with price dis-
crimination analyzed through inquiry into linkages between the pro-
tected buyers and other buyers that would be affected if the acquisition or
merger harmed the protected buyers. Other aspects of the Guidelines
could remain. It was not the purpose of my Article to explore or replace
such aspects of the Guidelines as pairwise versus collective comparisons,
or to examine use of competitive versus prevailing price levels. The two
recommended changes would reduce court confusion and generate mar-
ket definitions that better promote the purposes of the antitrust laws.
II. APPLICATION OF THE AFFECTED-BUYERS MODEL
This section addresses four issues raised by Werden. First, Werden
finds ambiguity in applying the affected-buyers model to mergers. While
my Article's initial description of this model was not phrased in terms of
two merging firms, the analysis does not vary much across different types
23. Harris & Jorde, supra note 3, at 46, 50, 56.
24. 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4492, at 6879-9 - 6879-11. See also Werden, supra note 3, at
522, 529-30, 572, 578 (new Guidelines do not presume price discrimination and will not narrow
markets if present).
[Vol. 62:671
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of antitrust cases. The discussion of United States v. Continental Can
Co.25 illustrated the affected-buyer's approach in merger cases. The case
involved the merger of a glass container manufacturer with a metal
container manufacturer. The affected-buyers model starts with a group
of buyers that the action subject to antitrust scrutiny may harm, such as
beer-container buyers. Potentially harmed beer-container buyers are
most likely to be premerger buyers of glass bottles or metal cans, but
buyers of other types of beer containers also may be protected buyers.26
The protected buyers are not limited to premerger buyers from both
firms, or to buyers who find the products of both firms to be good substi-
tutes. The affected-buyers model next determines whether other buyers
would be affected if the merger lessened competition and the protected
buyers faced higher prices. Linkages in the purchases and the prices paid
by buyers may, for example, lead to the inclusion of some other beverage-
container buyers in the buyers baseline. Then the affected-buyers model
delineates close substitutes with respect to this buyers baseline. The
court, the Justice Department, or the Federal Trade Commission would
calculate and evaluate market shares in the context of this relevant
market.
Second, Werden claims that the affected-buyers model does not con-
sider the link between affected buyers and buyers from indirect competi-
tors. A hypothetical increase in the price charged by a firm to the
protected buyers may affect the firm's sales to another group of buyers.
The latter buyers should be included in the buyers baseline (affected buy-
ers) along with the protected buyers. The next step in the affected-buyers
model includes in the relevant market the competitive check on sales to
the affected buyers, not just on sales to the protected buyers. This step
sweeps into the relevant market all the competitors of a firm that check
the firm's prices to the protected buyers. Werden seems to argue that the
relevant market should include even sellers to whom the affected buyers
would not turn to as competitive alternatives in case the firm raised its
price to the protected buyers. However, any expansion of the relevant
market to such sellers would overstate the competitive check on the
firm's prices to the protected buyers, and possibly lead to the conclusion
that an anticompetitive act is lawful.27
25. 378 U.S. 441 (1964), discussed in Lavey, supra note 1, at 757, 761-63.
26. For example, there may be concern that an increased likelihood of collusion among
container manufacturers after the merger will harm keg buyers.
27. I accept the view in Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 967 that the protected buyers should
Number 4]
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Next, Werden points to my analysis of Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman
Instruments, Inc.," and claims that I erred by immediately grouping in
the same market all of the types of instruments sold by a firm. I used a
simplified scenario drawn from this case to illustrate the analysis of link-
ages among buyers of related products. The related products that I ana-
lyzed were sales of an instrument and sales of repair service for that
instrument.2 9 The affected-buyers analysis may divide a firm's output
into separate relevant markets, as described in my Article.3" A buyers
baseline is superior to a sellers baseline for developing such delineations
as I explained in Section I. Affected-buyers analysis may determine that
there is a strong linkage between buyers of an instrument (x) and buyers
of repair service for this instrument (y); for example, a price increase for
y would harm buyers of instrument x because they are future buyers of
repair service for it (y). When buyers of y constitute the protected buy-
ers, this linkage would warrant including buyers of x and buyers of y in
the same baseline for purposes of delineating a relevant market. There
may be a weak linkage, however, between buyers of another of the firm's
instruments (z) and buyers of x and y. Also, z may be a poor substitute
for x and y. Then, z would be in a separate product market from x and y.
Finally, Werden strains the application of affected-buyers analysis to a
merger between the only supplier of an instrument and the only supplier
be economically substantial enough to merit the antitrust laws' protection. My Article discussed
market analysis when there are many more alternatives available to the affected buyers than to the
protected buyers, and when the affected buyers barely exceed the protected buyers. Lavey, supra
note 1, at 752. See also Harris & Jorde, supra note 3, at 56 (need to limit the weight given to a small
percentage of highly mobile buyers).
28. 575 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979), discussed in Lavey, supra
note 1, at 753-55.
29. Other recent cases have found related products resulting in linked buyers. For example, in
Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 590 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Cal. 1984), the court emphasized the linkage
between buyers of micrographic equipment and buyers of replacement parts:
The impact of diminished competition is measured at the consumer level, i.e., the owners of
machines being served, rather than the organization servicing the machine. Some of plain-
tiff's evidence created the inference that Bell & Howell "lost" potential equipment
purchases because of their restrictive policy re sale of replacement parts. This, of course,
would tend to increase plaintiff's competitive stance [in machine repair services] by creating
more potential [non-Bell & Howell] customers.
Id. at 50 n.6. See also Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984) (linkage
between buyers of operating system software and buyers of central processing units).
30. See Lavey, supra note 1, at 762 (beer containers may be in a separate product market from
other containers); id. at 763-64 (banking services supplied to small depositors and small business
may be in a separate geographic market from banking services supplied to large depositors and large
businesses); id. at 765 n.58 (protective service provided in each locality may be in a separate geo-
graphic market).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss4/4
FOCUS OF ANTITRUST MARKETS
of repair service for this instrument. Linked demand for these related
products may mean that these firms should be viewed as in the same
market: they supply a package in competition with other packages of
instruments and repair services.3 The linkage between these two suppli-
ers from the buyers' perspective, however, does not mean that their
merger lessens competition. The set of substitutable packages of instru-
ments and repair services would be unchanged by the merger. Further-
more, there would continue to be for buyers choosing this instrument
and its repair service only one source (albeit from one rather than two
firms) for supply of each of these related products.32 The merger is not
likely to lessen competition for sales to any group of affected buyers.
Correct application of affected-buyers analysis probably would not op-
pose this merger.
III. CONCLUSION
I am pleased to find a growing scholarly literature and body of anti-
trust law supporting a buyers-baseline approach to defining antitrust
markets. The mixed approach in the Guidelines using sellers as well as
buyers baselines is likely to confuse courts and lead to wrong decisions
about antitrust injury. Correct applications of affected-buyers analysis
satisfy Werden's concerns.
31. Id. at 754.
32. This assumes that the nonhorizontal merger does not create barriers to entry or otherwise
facilitate anticompetitive practices.
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